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The Economist recently reported that infrastructure spending is the largest it is ever been 
as a share of world GDP. With $22 trillion in projected investments over the next ten 
years in emerging economies alone, the magazine calls it the "biggest investment boom in 
history."1 The efficiency of infrastructure planning and execution is therefore particularly 
important at present. Unfortunately, the private sector, the public sector and 
private/public sector partnerships have a dismal record of delivering on large 
infrastructure cost and performance promises.  Consider the following typical examples. 
 
In January 2003, Toll Collect – a consortium of DaimlerChrysler, Deutsche 
Telekom, and Cofiroute of France – was scheduled to start tolling heavy trucks on 
German motorways for the Federal government. The new tolling system was designed to 
be a showcase for public-private partnership in infrastructure management. A year later 
the project was falling apart. The developers had been too optimistic about the software 
that would run the system. The government was losing toll revenues of €156 million 
($244m) a month, caused by delays, and estimated to total €6.5 billion before problems 
could be fixed. For lack of funds, all new road projects in Germany and related public 
works were put on hold, threatening 70,000 construction jobs. Politicians and members 
of the media were calling for prosecution of Toll Collect for deceiving the government. 
Finally, the German transport minister cancelled the contract with Toll Collect and gave 
the company two months to come up with a better plan, including how to fill the revenue 
shortfall. By the time tolling at last started, after further delays in 2005, "Toll Collect" 
had become a popular byword among Germans used to describe everything wrong with 
the national economy. 
  
In 1987, Eurotunnel, the private company that operates the tunnel under the 
English Channel, went public to raise funds for the project. The Channel tunnel was 
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prime minister Margaret Thatcher's flagship project to show the world how private 
business could effectively provide public infrastructure. Eurotunnel told investors that 
building the tunnel--the longest of its kind in Europe--would be relatively straightforward 
and that 10% “would be a reasonable allowance for the possible impact of 
unforeseen circumstances on construction costs."2 Once built, the real cost of the project 
was double the forecasted costs in constant dollars. Initially, the misinformation about 
costs and risks served the purpose of getting the project started. From the 1987 IPO until 
cost overruns hit the project one and a half years later, share prices more than tripled. 
Then they fell by two thirds and, when it became clear that revenue projections were as 
biased as cost forecasts, by another two-third. In 1995, Eurotunnel stopped interest 
payments on its loans and began a decade-long, tumultuous process of financial 
restructuring from which it did not recover until 2007. The intended flagship of 
privatization became a scare story for business and set back the process of infrastructure 
privatization by at least a decade. 
 
In 1959, the construction of Sydney Opera House started before either drawings or funds 
were fully available. The initial budget of seven million Australian dollars was a 
political, low-balled budget designed for project approval before the coming elections.3 
Eventually the Opera House was opened in 1973, 10 years later than the original 
planned completion date, at a cost of 102 million Australian dollars. It holds the world 
record for cost overrun at 1,400 percent and this was for a scaled-down version of the 
original design. This figure does not include 45 million dollars allocated in 2002 in part 
to bring the building more in agreement with the architect, Jørn Utzon’s original plans. 
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Over Budget, Over Time, Over and Over Again 
There are some phenomena that have no cultural bounds such as maternal love and a 
healthy fear of large predators. We can add to this list the fact that, across the globe, large 
infrastructure projects almost invariably arrive late, over-budget and fail to perform up to 
expectations. Cost overruns and benefit shortfalls of 50 percent are common; cost 
overruns above 100 percent are not uncommon. For example, in one study of major 
projects in 20 countries, nine out of ten projects had cost overruns.4  Similarly, a study of 
44 urban rail projects in North America, Europe, and developing nations, including 
London's Tube and the metros in Washington DC and Mexico City, found that the 
average construction cost overrun in constant prices was 45 percent; for a quarter of the 
projects cost overruns were at least 60 percent. In addition, passenger ridership was, on 
average, 50 percent lower than forecast. Furthermore, for a quarter of the projects, 
ridership was at least 70 percent lower than estimated.5 An appropriate slogan seems to 
be "over budget, over time, over and over again”. As comforting as it is to know that we 
are not alone in our folly, it would be even better to minimize the gap between 
expectations and performance for projects that consume such a large share of the private 
and, especially, public purse.  
Executives typically attribute project underperformance to numerous uncertainties 
such as project complexity, technological uncertainty, demand uncertainty, scope clarity, 
unexpected geological features and negative plurality (i.e., opposing stakeholder voices).6  
No doubt, all of these factors at one time or another contribute to cost overruns, benefit 
shortfalls, and time delays. The goal of this article, however, is not to explain, for 
example, how to implement complex projects more efficiently by over-coming these 
uncertainties. Rather, we explain why cost, benefits and time forecasts for more complex 
projects are systematically over-optimistic in the planning phase in comparison to less 
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complex projects. In other words, “why do project planners, on average, fail to anticipate 
the greater costs of complex projects or those based on new technologies, etc.?” 
The underlying reasons for all forecasting errors can usefully be grouped into 
three categories: 1) delusions or honest mistakes; 2) deceptions or strategic manipulation 
of information or processes or 3) bad luck.7  Bad luck or the unfortunate resolution of one 
of the major project uncertainties is the attribution typically given by management for a 
poor outcome.8 While not denying such a salient explanation, this article explores the 
underlying psychological and governance reasons for mis-estimation rather than 
proximate engineering causes. 
 Deliberately or not, risks of scope changes, high complexity, and unexpected 
geological features are systematically underestimated during project preparation. Both 
delusion and deception see the high failure rates for ventures as a consequence of flawed 
decision making. According to the first explanation - delusion - the flaw consists in 
executives falling victim to what psychologists call the planning fallacy.9 In its grip, 
managers make decisions based on delusional optimism rather than on a rational 
weighting of gains, losses, and probabilities. They overestimate benefits and 
underestimate costs and time. They involuntarily spin scenarios of success and overlook 
the potential for mistakes and miscalculations. As a result, managers pursue initiatives 
that are unlikely to come in on budget or on time, or to ever deliver the expected returns. 
These biases are often the result of the inside view in forecasting: decision makers have a 
strong tendency to consider problems as unique and thus focus on the particulars of the 
case at hand when generating solutions.10 Adopting an outside view of the problem has 
been shown to mitigate delusion. It is applied by ignoring the specific details of the 
project at hand and uses a broad reference class of similar projects to forecast outcomes 
for the current project. 
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According to the second explanation - deception - decision-making is flawed by 
strategic misrepresentation or the presence of what economists refer to as principal-agent 
problems. Whereas the first explanation is psychological, the second is due to the 
different preferences and incentives of the actors in the system.11 In this situation, 
politicians, planners or project champions deliberately and strategically overestimate 
benefits and underestimate costs in order to increase the likelihood that their projects, and 
not their competition's, gain approval and funding. These actors purposely spin scenarios 
of success and gloss over the potential for failure. This results in managers promoting 
ventures that are unlikely to come in on budget or on time, or to deliver the promised 
benefits.  However, this misrepresentation and failure can be moderated by measures that 
enhance transparency, provide accountability, and align incentives.  
While delusion and deception have each been addressed in the management 
literature before, in what follows they are jointly considered for the first time. In addition, 
they are specifically applied to infrastructure problems in such a way that both academics 
from diverse fields and, more importantly, practitioners can understand and implement 
the suggested corrective procedures. Among its contributions, the article provides a 
framework for analyzing the relative explanatory power of delusion and deception in 
such a way that it is possible to disentangle whether non-accurate forecast are more likely 
to be due to one or the other explanation, or both. Moreover, it suggests a simplified 
framework for analyzing the complex principal-agent relationships that are involved in 
the approval and construction of large infrastructure projects. This will facilitate the 
design of incentive systems and corrective procedures for improving forecasts, which is a 
major goal of the article. 
The article is organized in two main parts. In the first part, we initially discuss the 
cognitive factors that produce delusion and then political and economic explanations of 
deception. An analysis of the complementary nature of explanations based on delusion 
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and deception follows. In the second part, we build on these models and show how 
appropriate financial and non-financial incentives can mitigate deception. To conclude, 
we illustrate reference class forecasting, an outside view debiasing technique that has 
proven successful in overcoming both delusion and deception in private and public 
investment decisions. 
 
Delusion and Deception in Large Capital Projects 
Delusion 
Our first explanation – delusion – accounts for the cost underestimation and benefit 
overestimation that occurs when people generate predictions using the inside view. 
Executives adopt an inside view of the problem by focusing tightly on the case at hand, 
by considering the plan and the obstacles to its completion, by constructing scenarios of 
future progress, and by extrapolating current trends.12 In other words, by using typical 
bottom-up decision making techniques, they think about a problem by bringing to bear all 
they know about it, with special attention to its unique details. Below we illustrate two 
cognitive delusions the inside view facilitates: the planning fallacy as well as a heuristic - 
rule of thumb - called anchoring and adjustment. 
When forecasting the outcomes of risky projects, executives often fall victim to 
the planning fallacy. Psychologists have defined it as the tendency to underestimate task-
completion times and costs, even knowing that the vast majority of similar tasks have run 
late or gone over budget.13 It is a well-established bias in the experimental literature. In 
one set of experiments, Buehler, Griffin and Ross assessed the accuracy of psychology 
students’ estimates of completion times for their year-long honors thesis project.14 In the 
experiments, the students’ “realistic” predictions were overly optimistic: 70% took longer 
than the predicted time, even though the question was asked toward the end of the year.  
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On average, students took 55 days to complete their thesis, which was 22 days longer 
than predicted. Similar results have been found with various types of subjects and for a 
wide variety of tasks such as holiday shopping, filing taxes, and other routine chores.15  
These findings are not limited to the laboratory. Cost and time overruns in large 
infrastructure projects have been studied by considering numerous contractual 
arrangements. In the case of conventional procurement, in which the public entity 
separately engages with several private companies, each of them providing a specific part 
of the service, costs and times overruns have been systematically observed in a wide 
range of projects.16  In business, executives and entrepreneurs seem to be highly 
susceptible to this bias. Studies that compared the actual outcomes of capital investment 
projects, mergers and acquisitions, and market entries with managers’ original 
expectations for those ventures show a strong tendency towards overoptimism.17 An 
analysis of start-up ventures in a wide range of industries found that more than 80% 
failed to achieve their market-share target.18  
Anchoring and adjustment is another consequence of the inside view thinking that 
leads to optimistic forecasts.19 Anchoring on plans is one of the most robust biases of 
judgment.  The first number that is considered as a possible answer to a question serves 
as an “anchor”. Even when people know that the anchor is too high or too low, their 
adjustments away from it are almost always insufficient. A classic experiment revealed 
the power of anchoring and insufficient adjustment. People were asked to estimate 
various percentages, such as the percentage of African countries in the United Nations.20 
For each quantity, a number was determined by spinning a wheel of fortune in the 
presence of the subject. The subjects were first asked to indicate whether the number was 
higher or lower than the percentage of African countries and then to estimate the 
percentage by moving upward or downward from the arbitrary number.  The arbitrary 
number had a substantial effect on the estimates. For instance, the median estimate of the 
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percentage of African countries in the United Nation was strongly related to the starting 
points: individuals who received 10, estimated 25% whereas those that received 65, 
estimated 45%. These subjects started from a random anchor and then insufficiently 
adjusted away from it. 
Similar results have been found with experienced real estate brokers who were 
asked to assess the value of a property.21 These agents unanimously agreed that they did 
not factor a house’s listing price into their evaluation of its “true” value.  Each of the 
agents was given a 10 page booklet on the house that was being sold, which included 
information specific to the house as well as information about the prices and 
characteristics of other houses in the area that had recently been sold. The only difference 
in the information that the various brokers received was the listing price of the house, 
which was randomly manipulated within a range of plus or minus 11% of the actual 
listing price.  The agents then went out and visited the house that was being sold, as well 
as several other houses in the neighborhood.  The listing price significantly affected these 
experienced agents’ evaluations.  Furthermore, when told about the results, the agents 
maintained that the listing price anchor had no effect!  
 In the context of planning for a large infrastructure project there is always a plan, 
which is very likely to serve as an anchor. Furthermore, the plan that is developed is 
almost always seen as a “realistic” best or most likely case. Executives know that events 
may develop beyond the best or most likely case so they generally attempt to capture 
unforeseen costs by building in a contingency fund that is proportional to the size of the 
project (e.g. for cost overruns in capital investment projects). However, when compared 
with actual cost overruns, such adjustments are clearly and significantly inadequate.22 
Furthermore, the initial estimate serves as an anchor for later stage estimates, which never 
sufficiently adjust to the reality of the project’s performance. 
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The power of these heuristics and biases is well illustrated in a field study where the 
Rand Corporation examined 44 chemical process plants (Pioneer Process Plants), owned 
by firms such as 3M, du Pont and Texaco among others. Actual construction costs were 
over twice as large as the initial estimates.23 Furthermore, even a year after start-up about 
half of the plants (21) produced at less than 75% of their design capacity, with a quarter 
of the plants producing at less than 50% of their design capacity. Many of the plants in 
this latter category had their performance expectations permanently lowered. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the typical initial estimate is less than half the final cost. 
Furthermore, at every subsequent stage of the process, managers underestimate the cost 
of completing the construction of Pioneer Process Plants.  
 --------------------------------- 
Add Figure 1 here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
Deception 
Our second explanatory model – deception – accounts for flawed planning in decision 
making in terms of politics and agency issues. With this model we introduce political and 
organizational pressures in executive decision-making. We describe the principal-agent 
problem first and the sources of strategic deception second.  
 
The Principal-Agent Problem in Large Capital Investments 
In this section we talk about principal-agent (P-A) problems, which have mainly been 
examined in the context of private firms but which can be even more pernicious in public 
situations.24  These are defined by relationships where a principal engages an agent to act 
on his or her behalf. Typical examples include a Board hiring a CEO to manage the 
  11 
company on behalf of the shareholders or a manager hiring an employee to carry out 
tasks. In fact, there is a P-A relationship for every two levels in an organization.  
Large capital investment projects are situations where a multi-tier principal-agent 
problem exists.25 An example will help illustrate the framework. Consider a local 
government that intends to build a new tunnel across a large capital city, for the benefits 
of the local residents and, more broadly, of the state population. The focal project will 
compete with other projects for funds from the state government. Once the approval is 
obtained, the local government puts construction out for tender. The winning bidder will 
carry out the construction of the infrastructure.  
Figure 2 graphically represents the complexity of the P-A relationships in the case 
of a large capital investment proposed by a local government to the state government. In 
this specific example, there are three tiers of P-A relationships. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Add Figure 2 here 
--------------------------------- 
 
The first tier encompasses the relationship between taxpayers and the state 
government. Taxpayers are the principal, whereas the state government is the agent of the 
taxpayers that is supposed to act in their interest. As the final beneficiaries of the 
infrastructure, taxpayers expect projects to deliver the largest possible benefits to the 
community, by incurring minimal costs, attenuating risks and reaching completion within 
an agreed timeline. Individuals in the state government, who are elected by taxpayers, 
typically have their own interests, for example being re-elected and/or being remembered 
for the building of monumental infrastructures.  
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The second tier of P-A relationships has the local government acting as the agent 
of both taxpayers and state government. With respect to the taxpayers, the local 
government has the duty to propose infrastructures that provide the largest benefits to the 
community, and that are delivered on budget and on time. With respect to the state 
government, it has a duty of suggesting the best allocation of the taxpayer funds. 
Moreover, holding the most complete data about costs and benefits of the infrastructure 
that it proposes, it has the duty of providing the state government with the most accurate 
forecasts needed to make an informed decision. However, given the competition for 
scarce resources, the local government has an interest in understating its risks and costs, 
while overstating their benefits.  
The mechanism of benefit overestimation is very simple as explained by an 
interviewee in research done by one of us (Flyvbjerg) and the Danish consultancy firm 
Cowi:  “The system encourages people to focus on the benefits--because until now there 
has not been much focus on the quality of risk analysis and the robustness [of projects]. It 
is therefore important for project promoters to demonstrate all the benefits […].”26 In 
addition, knowing that the next election usually happens before the time that the proposed 
project is built and sometimes even approved, the local government has little interest in 
providing accurate forecasts. As shown by Flyvbjerg in his research on the Sydney Opera 
House, Joe Cahill, the Labor-premier of New South Wales, publicized a political budget 
for approval and fast-tracked construction to start before the elections, in case the Labor 
party lost the elections and attempts would be made to stop the project. According to Bob 
Carr, who later followed Cahill as premier of New South Wales, Cahill instructed his 
people "to go down to Bennelong Point [the site of the Sydney Opera House] and make 
such progress that no-one who succeeds me can stop this [the Opera House] going 
through to completion."27 When the premier's lowballing and fast-tracking of the Opera 
House inevitably led to cost overruns, the architect, Jørn Utzon, was blamed. Utzon 
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prefers to remain out of the public eye, but his son, architect Kim Utzon, explains in lieu 
of his father: “It was a political decision to publicize a low budget for the building, which 
was expected to gain approval in the political system, but which was very quickly 
exceeded. So even if the cost overrun turned out to be 1,400 percent in relation to the 
publicized budget, this budget was an eighth of the real budget for the building. So the 
real cost overrun is only 100 percent. The rest was politics.”28  
The third tier of P-A relationships involves the local government as the principal 
of agents hired to provide specific services, such as analysts and planners as well as 
contractors. Analysts and planners are engaged to gather the information necessary for 
making the final go/no-go decision. They have an incentive to provide information that is 
compatible with pleasing the local government, having the project approved, and being 
re-engaged on the next project. A manager on a large infrastructure project explained to 
Flyvbjerg and Cowi in their research on transport infrastructure management in the UK: 
"Most decent consultants will write off obviously bad projects but there is a grey zone 
and I think many consultants in reality have an incentive to try to prolong the life of 
projects, which means to get them through the business case. It is in line with their need 
to make a profit."29 Another interviewee in the same study recognized that planners have 
better information than politicians but have no incentive to reveal such information, but 
rather the opposite: “You will often as a planner know the real costs. You know that the 
budget is too low but it is difficult to pass such a message to the counsellors [politicians] 
and the private actors. They know that high costs reduce the chances of national 
funding.” Similarly, builders have the primary interests to win the tender, by offering the 
lowest possible price, since they know that re-contracting is often possible and, unless the 
contract is a fixed price and lump sum contract, delays will be tolerated. Even if interests 
are divergent in this case, cost-overruns and delays are tolerated unless the local 
government is held responsible. Clearly, the multi-tier relationship described in this 
  14 
specific example of the construction of a cross-city tunnel can be easily extended to the 
approval of any kind of large public infrastructure project.  
 
Sources of strategic deception  
There are certain conditions, however, that make strategic deception more likely within 
each P-A relationship. Self-interest, asymmetric information, differences in risk 
preferences and time horizons as well as the clarity of accountability are among the most 
cited causes. 
A necessary condition for P-A conflicts is a difference in the actors’ self-interest. 
Executive ventures, public and private, are often multimillion- and sometimes even 
multibillion-dollar projects. When they go forward, many stakeholders (e.g. contractors, 
engineers, architects, bankers, landowners, construction workers, lawyers, accountants 
and developers) have widely divergent incentives. In addition, politicians and executives 
may use ventures to jockey for position and to build monuments, which allows 
administrators to get larger budgets, and cities to acquire investments in infrastructure 
that would otherwise go elsewhere.30 If these stakeholders are involved in, or indirectly 
influence, the forecasting of costs and benefits at the approval stage (the business case), 
this is liable to bias the entire subsequent process.  
Political and economic self-interest also exists at the level of cities and states. 
Pickrell pointed out that transit capital investment projects in the US compete for 
discretionary grants from a limited federal budget each year, and that this creates an 
incentive for cities to make their projects look better, or else some other city may get the 
money.31 Flyvbjerg and Cowi found similar results for the UK.32 Altshuler and Luberoff, 
Delaney and Eckstein, and Morris and Hough found corresponding results for other 
project types, including major roads, tunnels and bridges, airports, stadiums, power 
stations, oil and gas extraction, and IT systems.33 
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 A second source of strategic deception is the presence of asymmetric information, 
which means the agent who champions a project (e.g. the local government in the 
example above) has information that the principal does not (e.g. the state government). 
Being unaware of all the relevant information, the principal and ultimate decision maker 
may be easy to deceive. In a recent study, Flyvbjerg and Cowi interviewed public 
officials, planners, and consultants who had been involved in the development of large 
UK transportation infrastructure projects.34 This study shows that strong interests and 
strong incentives exist at the project approval stage to present projects’ costs and benefits 
as favorably as possible. Local authorities, local politicians, local officials, and some 
consultants (as agent’s) all stand to benefit from a project that looks favorable on paper 
and have little incentive to actively avoid distorted estimates of benefits, costs, and risks. 
National bodies, like the Department for Transport and the Treasury, act as a principal 
and usually fund and oversee projects. They usually have an interest in more balanced 
appraisals, but so far they have had little success in achieving such balance. This situation 
may be changing with recent schemes to curb the optimism bias, which were initiated by 
HM Treasury in order to gain better predictability and control in public budgeting.35 
A third relevant source of P-A issues is the presence of different risk preferences. 
For instance, if the principal is risk averse, the agent who submits a proposal for approval 
will have to downplay the possible risks of the venture in order to convince the principal. 
Because of this, managers lower down in the organization may have to misrepresent, hide 
and manipulate information in order to get requests for funds approved. 
In addition to any inherent difference in risk preferences between decision makers 
and organizations or the public, another factor that comes into play is the vastly different 
time horizons the actors use to evaluate the decision. Typically, this is very long for 
taxpayers, but less than a decade for the individuals that are acting on their behalf. These 
agents may also be concerned with being remembered for initiating monumental 
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infrastructure or, more prosaically, being re-elected. In fact, whereas a standard election 
term is 4 years, the average length of the time from the start of planning to start of 
operations for a large infrastructure project is commonly 10-15 years.36 
Finally, another condition that leads to strategic deception is diffuse or asymmetric 
accountability. When multiple people are responsible for the ultimate success or failure 
of a project, it can be difficult for any one agent to be held accountable for a bad 
outcome. If a new initiative fails, it is often hard to place the blame squarely on one or a 
few actors. This lack of accountability ex-post can cause the agent to promote ex-ante 
projects that protect them from being held accountable if it fails, which may not be the 
project that maximizes the principal’s total payoff.37 In addition, the lack of clear 
accountability can exacerbate the problem of asymmetric information and differences in 
risk preferences, causing the agent to take more risk than the principal would like. 
 
Diagnosing the Relative Impact of Delusion and Deception 
Delusion and deception are two complementary rather than alternative explanations of 
failure of large infrastructure projects due to cost underestimation and benefit 
overestimation. Although, in practice, it is often difficult clearly disentangle the two 
explanations. There are situations, however, where the explanatory power of one of the 
two models is relatively higher.  
The relative strength of each explanation depends on different factors. The key to 
minimizing delusion is to have a good learning environment.  Learning occurs “when 
closely similar problems are frequently encountered, especially if the outcomes of 
decisions are quickly known and provide unequivocal feedback”.38 Whereas, the problem 
of strategic deception occurs when incentives are mis-aligned.  The underlying causes of 
these mis-alignments are differences in preferences, time horizons, incentives, and 
information between principals and agents.  
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Figure 3 describes situations where we can expect explanations due to delusion, 
deception, both, or neither to operate. The figure is divided in four regions.  When the 
learning environment is good and incentives are well-aligned, there is minimal scope for 
delusion or deception and forecasts tend to be unbiased. Weather forecasts are an 
example. Meteorologists have no reason to lie and the feedback they receive is so 
frequent and unambiguous detailed computer models guide their predictions.    
Small entrepreneurs’ who own the vast majority of their companies have 
incentives that are well aligned so that we expect most of their errors to be due to 
delusions. These forecasting errors tend to be quite large. For example, 33% of 
entrepreneurs perceive their chances of success to be certain, which is obviously is 
deluded given that over 80% of such ventures fail.39 
Many computer gaming companies release numerous titles frequently, so their 
learning environments are good yet they continuously state release dates they do not stick 
to.  This type of deception has been labeled “Cheap Talk” and is designed to pre-empt 
sales of competitors’ products.40 
The largest errors occur when delusions and deception operate simultaneously.  
Even within this section useful distinctions can be made.  For example, in the private 
sphere, we consider the construction of process plants. These need to be distinguished 
between normal process plants and pioneer process plants. They both have similar 
incentives since they are owned by the same companies, but the former is relatively more 
frequent and therefore learning is improved and forecasts are more accurate. 
In the public sphere, we consider the examples of rails and roads. Cost 
underestimation and overrun for rail are on average approximately twice that for roads.41 
Similarly, average ridership overestimation for planned rail projects is around 100%, 
whereas such bias is not found for road projects.42 The differences between rail and road 
are statistically highly significant and may largely be explained in terms of differences in 
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incentive structures and the possibility to learn from previous and similar projects. In fact, 
rail projects typically compete for discretionary grants from a limited national or federal 
budget. This creates an incentive for promoters (agents) to make their projects look better 
on paper with artificially high benefit/cost ratios, or else the central government (the 
principal) may decide to fund some other project.43 That is, there are incentives to 
provide biased estimates.  
In the case of roads, funds are typically allocated as block grants with a certain 
amount of dollars allocated for road building as where individual projects do not compete 
for funds directly against each other or against other types of projects outside the 
highway agency. As a consequence, the misalignment of incentives between promoters 
and approvers are higher for rail than for roads. This conclusion is supported by a study 
of stated causes for inaccuracies in traffic forecasts for 234 rail and road projects. For rail 
projects, deception in terms of "deliberately slanted forecasts" was explicitly stated as a 
main cause of inaccurate (biased) forecasts in 25% of projects, whereas this was the case 
for zero road projects.44 This does not mean that estimates of costs and benefits of 
planned roads are never deceptive. This source of bias, however, appears to be less 
prevalent and less systematic for road than for rail projects.   Finally, road projects are 
more common than rail projects, so the opportunity for learning is greater as well.45 
For the largest public infrastructure projects, such as the Sydney Opera House, the 
Channel tunnel, concert halls or stadiums, the cost blowouts appear to be more heavily 
weighted towards deception. This suggests new governance procedures are needed to 
minimize waste in the upcoming infrastructure boom. 
         ------- ------ -------- 
Add Figure 3 here 
------ ------- -------- 
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Overcoming Delusion and Deception in Large Infrastructure 
Projects   
Delusion and deception are not insurmountable. While every large infrastructure project 
has its own idiosyncrasies, these projects are all prone to delusion and deception, 
regardless of the private or public funding institution. This section of the article addresses 
some prescriptive governance advice for overcoming delusion and deception. First, we 
focus on possible techniques useful for overcoming deception. We address financial and 
non-financial incentives46 for the agents, namely the proposing and the approving 
institutions, planners and contractors. Then, we discuss the adoption of an outside view, 
which deliberately avoids the details of the case at hand and simply focuses on 
understanding the historical statistics and patterns of similar projects. The specific outside 
view tool we use is reference class forecasting, where decision makers search for an 
unbiased, representative population of similar and past cases that will become useful to 
make unbiased predictions of the future. When delusion and deception are difficult to 
disentangle, reference class forecasting has been successful in overcoming both 
dysfunctional behaviors in diverse settings, including major transport scheme 
forecasting47 and movie forecasting.48 
 
Overcoming Deception through Accountability and Transparency 
Financial and non-financial incentives should be given to the agents of taxpayers and the 
institution proposing the project. We first discuss incentives for proposing and approving 
institutions and then we turn our attention to the incentives for planners and bidders. 
 
Incentives for the Agents of the Taxpayers: Institutions Proposing and Approving 
Large Capital Infrastructure Projects 
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As shown by Flyvbjerg,49 artificially low costs, exaggerated benefits and underestimated 
risks are common strategies employed by the proposing institution to have a large 
infrastructure project approved. This is facilitated by the asymmetric information existing 
between those who propose a large infrastructure project and those who approve and fund 
it. In addition, lack of clear accountability and the misalignment of time horizons may 
lead the proposing individual(s) to take more risk than the funding institution or the 
taxpayers would like. To overcome deception (as well as empire building motives) there 
are two key best practices that have been employed: (1) the proposing and the approving 
institutions should share financial responsibility and (2) private financers should 
participate in financing the project with their own capital at risk.50 We examine these 
issues in turn. 
Institutions proposing and approving large infrastructure projects should share 
financial responsibility for covering cost overruns and benefit shortfalls resulting from 
misrepresentation and bias in forecasting, which helps align incentives. In a recent 
consultation document,51 the U.K. Department for Transport proposes a requirement for 
all large infrastructure projects that asks for funds from the Department to have a 
minimum local contribution of 10% (25% for light rail) of the gross cost in order to gain 
program entry, upon the belief that “if an authority has a financial stake in a scheme this 
provides a clear incentive to ensure that the right structures and resources are in place to 
bring it to fruition to time and budget”.52 Recognizing that planners are subject to 
optimism bias, the Department for Transport requires that all requests for funds include 
an “Optimism Bias Uplift”, which is an empirically based adjustment to a project’s costs 
for different percentiles of cost overruns, on the basis of the project type. The uplifts are 
computed on the basis of actual cost overruns in a reference class of completed projects 
comparable to the project seeking funding. For example, if the funding institution was 
prepared to accept a 50% risk of cost overrun (the ‘50% percentile’) on a road scheme 
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then an uplift of 15% should be applied. But if the funding institution was only prepared 
to accept a 20% risk of cost overrun (the ‘80% percentile’) then a higher uplift of 32% 
was recommended. In addition, those uplifts are different for project types - the same 
50% percentile uplift for rail would be 40% (which is almost three times the amount for 
roads) – and for different stages of development – uplifts are the highest for “programme 
entry” and the lowest when the project is receiving “full approval”. Notice that these top 
down estimate uplifts encompass the different complexities of the projects without going 
into specific details, which is the point of the outside view. 
The “Optimism Bias Uplift” is useful to control cost underestimation before the 
approval of projects. If no measure is taken to control cost escalation after project 
approval, promoters would simply “postpone” the appearance of costs during the project 
construction. Therefore, to discourage cost increases during the implementation of the 
project, the Department for Transport advises that requests for funds should include an 
additional risk allowance in the amount of 50% of the Optimism Bias uplift. If during the 
implementation phase a project requires further expenditures that are within the risk 
allowance, these do not require additional approval from the funding institution. 
However, the local authority is expected to contribute at least 50% of the cost increase. 
The local authority should be expected to fund any expenditure in excess of that risk 
allowance.53 In this way a clear incentive has been imposed on the local authority to 
avoid cost overruns. Such an incentive did not exist before. 
Beside the provision of the Optimism Bias uplifts, the UK Department for 
Transport requires promoters to construct a comprehensive Risk Register to mitigate the 
risk involved in the implementation of large schemes. This register lists the risks that are 
likely to affect the delivery and operation of the proposed infrastructure. Construction 
risks (e.g., timescale and cost perspectives) and operational risks (e.g., maintenance risk 
and revenue risk) and a share of risks associated with climate change should be included 
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in the register. In addition, it advises that the Risk Register “needs to identify who owns 
the identified risk. For example, some risks may be transferable through insurance or 
financial instruments”.54 
In addition, to obtain more realistic forecasts and reduced risk, full public 
financing or full financing with a sovereign guarantee should be avoided. Whenever 
possible, the decision to go ahead with a project should be made contingent on the 
willingness of private financiers to participate without a sovereign guarantee for at least 
one third of the total capital needs. The lower limit of a one-third share of private risk 
capital is based on practical experience.55 Contracts should be written in such a manner 
that risk allocation is balanced, i.e., the risk to private financiers must be real, with no 
comfy escape clauses that return risk to the taxpayer when things get difficult. This has 
been beneficial in situations where the project passed the market test as well as when it 
did not (i.e., whether the project has been subsidized or not). Private lenders, 
shareholders, and stock market analysts should produce their own forecasts or should 
critically monitor existing ones. If they were wrong about the forecasts, they and their 
organizations should be held responsible for the mistakes.  
 
Incentives for the Agents of the Proposing Institution: Planners and Bidders 
Incentives for planners and bidders encompass two measures that address strategic 
misrepresentation in the proposal and the bidding phases respectively. We discuss them 
in turn. 
To decrease the likelihood of strategic misrepresentation of costs, timeframe and 
benefits, incentives aiming to achieve higher transparency should be used in order to 
align the incentives of the planners (and the proposing institution) to provide more 
accurate forecasts. To provide incentives to planners to disclose their information 
regarding the specifics of the projects, rewards and higher criticisms of the forecasts 
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could be two fruitful alternatives. For instance, financial and non-financial rewards 
should be promoted for planners who provide realistic estimates. In addition, forecasts 
should be subject to detailed assessment and criticism, such as expert and independent 
peer reviews, for projects with major public funding carried out by national or state 
accounting and auditing offices, like the General Accounting Office in the US or the 
National Audit Office in the UK, and for projects with private funding by independent 
private auditors. Other forms of scrutiny, such as public hearings and presentations of the 
forecasts to the scientific community, should also be encouraged. In the most egregious 
instances, criminal penalties for seriously misleading forecasts may be warranted.56 
However, these measures are not sufficient because they do not address 
opportunistic behaviors that are possible in the bidding phase. In the case of the Sydney 
Opera House, the Sydney Opera House Act was approved in 1960 with the provision that 
every 10% increase in the budget would require the Act to be amended by Parliament. 
This did not hold promoters, bidders and contractors from supporting underestimated 
costs and time for completion. In fact, during the tender, bidders can act opportunistically 
by assessing the probability that compensation is possible after the construction stage has 
been initiated. If compensation is possible, bidders will bid the lowest possible value in 
order to win the tender. The winning bidder will be typically the bidder who most 
underestimates the true costs of the project. We call this, the “winner’s blessing”.57 After 
the project bas been initiated, the initial low price will be compensated through 
overpricing the expected scope increases, which the experienced bidders know are almost 
certain. When compensation is not possible, there is less chance that the bidding price is 
artificially low. 
In this situation, the incentive is to place financial risk with bidders. In doing so, 
bidders have the incentive to disclose any specific information they have regarding costs 
and completion times, which is often a source of asymmetric information between 
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bidders and the institution managing the construction of the infrastructure. If appropriate 
measures to overcome deception are taken in the bidding stage, the construction stage 
should go rather smoothly. However, placing financial risk with contractors for delays 
and scope increases should be a safeguard to be used in conjunction with other measures, 
especially with regard to coordination between contractors and between contractors and 
the client.  
So far, we have illustrated several contractual arrangements that can be used to 
decrease the likelihood of strategic misrepresentation of costs, timeframe and benefits by 
transferring risks to the entities that would otherwise benefit from such 
misrepresentations. Rather than being part of separated arrangements, these measures can 
be bundled into one contract and a private sector entity can be charged with providing a 
flow of infrastructure services over time that goes beyond the provision of the building. 
For example, with a Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) contract,58 the 
private sector entity is responsible for the design, building, financing, operation and 
maintenance of an infrastructure under a very long period of time, usually 20-30 years, 
after which the facility is transferred to the public entity. This type of contract addresses 
in one place several of the mis-alignment issues discussed in this article. These are 
relatively new mechanisms and deserve further attention. 
Table 1 summarizes the key causes of deception and the proposed prescriptive 
advice. 
------- ------ -------- 
Add Table 1 here 
------ ------- -------- 
 
 
Overcoming Delusion and Deception through the “Outside View” 
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There are several instances where delusion and deception cannot be disentangled. To 
overcome both of them, the key recommendation is to adopt the outside view and, in 
particular, a forecasting method called "reference class forecasting".59  
The inside view is the conventional and intuitive approach in planning new 
projects. The traditional way to think about a project is to focus on the project itself and 
its details, paying special attention to its unique or unusual characteristics, and trying to 
predict the events (e.g. strikes or weather) that could influence its success. It essentially 
ignores the details of the case at hand, and involves no attempt at detailed forecasting of 
the future history of the project. Instead, it focuses on the statistics of a class of cases 
chosen to be similar in relevant respects to the present one. For example, similarity could 
be determined by project type, governance structure, complexity, etc. The case at hand is 
also compared to other members of the class, in attempt to assess its position in the 
distribution of outcomes for the class.60 Using the outside view executives and forecasters 
are not required to make scenarios, imagine events, or gauge their own and others' levels 
of ability and control, so they do not risk mis-estimating these factors.  
When both the inside and the outside view of forecasting are applied with equal 
skill, the outside view is much more likely to produce a realistic estimate.61 In very few 
instances, since it is based on historical precedent, the outside view may fail to predict 
extreme outcomes such as those that lie outside all historical precedents. But for most 
projects, the outside view will produce more accurate results. 
The outside view can be implemented through a technique that has been defined 
as reference class forecasting. It requires the decision maker to obtain a reference class of 
past, comparable cases when making predictions about costs and benefits of a new 
project. By introducing distributional information of successful as well as unsuccessful 
past projects, the decision maker is forced to consider the entire distribution of possible 
outcomes. This prevents the decision maker from focusing on easily recalled similar 
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projects, which are typically successful ones.62 The implementation of reference class 
forecasting is organized into five steps.63 
 
(1) Select a reference class. Identifying the right reference class involves both art 
and science. The decision maker usually has to weigh similarities and differences 
on many variables and determine which are the most meaningful in judging how 
the project at hand will play out. Sometimes that is easy. A planner who has to 
forecast the construction costs of a rail project planned in the manner that such a 
project is usually planned around the world would easily find a reference class.  In 
other cases, especially when the project requires the incorporation of a new 
technology, it is more difficult. The key is to choose a class that is broad enough 
to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly comparable to the 
project at hand. 
(2) Assess the distribution of outcomes. Once the reference class is chosen, the 
decision maker has to document the outcomes – in terms of whichever variable is 
considered pertinent, e.g. cost overrun, total costs or unit costs – of the prior 
projects and arrange them along a distribution of outcomes, showing the extremes, 
the median, and any clusters. Sometimes it will not be possible to precisely 
document the outcomes of every member of the class. However, a rough 
distribution can still be obtained by calculating the average outcome as well as a 
measure of variability. Obtaining good projects with valid data is the hardest and 
most time-consuming part of reference class forecasting. Results will only be as 
good as the projects and data that are used as input to the exercise. As part of data 
validation it must be decided what type of issues data take into account, e.g., 
uncertainty, design changes, and the like.  
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(3) Make an intuitive prediction of your project’s position in the distribution. 
Based on his or her own understanding of the project at hand and how it compares 
with the projects in the reference class, the decision maker needs to predict where 
it would fall along the distribution. Because the intuitive estimate will likely be 
biased, the final two steps are intended to adjust the estimate in order to arrive at a 
more accurate forecast. 
(4) Assess the reliability of your prediction. This step is intended to gauge the 
reliability of the forecast made in Step 3. The goal is to estimate the correlation 
between the forecast and the actual outcome, expressed as a coefficient between 0 
and 1, where 0 indicates no correlation and 1 indicates complete correlation. In 
the best case, information will be available on how well the decision maker’s past 
predictions matched the actual outcomes. Then, the correlation based on historical 
precedent can be estimated. In the absence of such information, assessments of 
predictability become more subjective. An estimate of predictability may be based 
on how the situation at hand compares with other forecasting situations. Through 
a diligent statistical analysis, the decision maker could construct a rough scale of 
predictability based on computed correlations between predictions and outcomes 
for other endeavors like road or bridge construction. He or she can then estimate 
where his or her ability to predict rail project construction costs lies on this scale. 
When the calculations are complex, it may help to bring in a skilled statistician. 
(5) Correct the intuitive estimates. Due to the bias, the intuitive estimate made in 
Step 3 will likely be optimistic – deviating too far from the average outcome of 
the reference class. In this final step, the estimate is adjusted toward the average 
based on the analysis of predictability in Step 4. The less reliable the prediction, 
the more estimate needs to be regressed toward the mean. Suppose that the 
intuitive prediction of the construction costs is $4 billion and that, on average, rail 
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projects in the reference class cost $7 billion. Suppose further that the correlation 
coefficient has been estimated to be 0.6. The regressed estimate of construction 
costs would be: 
$7B + [0.6 ($4B - $7B)] = $5.2B 
Thus, the adjustment for optimism will be substantial, particularly in highly 
uncertain situations where predictions are unreliable. 
 
Besides overcoming optimism bias and mitigating the problems that derive from 
strategic misrepresentation, reference class forecasting provides two other major benefits. 
First, since the reference class comprises previous projects, it helps to look across types 
of projects, geographies and types of financing methods to provide much more 
information to the decision maker. This represents a test to see which projects have 
worked out in the past and the kind of tweaks to the model that might increase the chance 
that the project at hand would be a success. Second, it helps to provide a reality check on 
whether the project is likely to perform up to expectations. 
The first instance of reference class forecasting in practice was carried out in 2004 
estimating the costs of the proposed Line 2 of the Edinburgh Tram. The business case 
estimations prepared by the promoters included a base cost of £255 million (US$400 
million) and an allowance for covering contingency and optimism bias that amounted to 
25% above the base cost. However, a reference class of 46 comparable rail projects 
indicated that the promoters' estimates were optimistic and that optimism bias uplifts 
should be applied. The reference class was established by Bent Flyvbjerg and Cowi in 
close collaboration with experts at the UK Department for Transport.64 Rail projects from 
Flyvbjerg's megaproject database were screened for inclusion, focusing on projects that 
had been planned and built under comparable regulatory and contractual regimes. 
Statistical tests were applied to decide whether projects were indeed comparable, before 
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inclusion in the reference class. After this, an independent review applied optimism bias 
uplifts to the promoters' capital cost estimates, based on cost overruns in the reference 
class as required by the UK Department for Transport, and thereby taking an outside view 
on the cost forecasts. The review concluded that total capital costs were more likely to be 
£357 million, with a 50% risk of going over budget. If the client wanted to reduce the risk 
of going over budget to 20%, higher uplifts had to be used and the capital cost budget 
would have been £400 million.65 
The resulting reaction to the reference class forecast was that the proposed tram 
was re-evaluated. Scottish Finance Secretary John Swinney publicly stated, "I want to be 
absolutely sure about the calculation of the costs involved in these projects, and the 
assessment of risk involved, before they progress further" (The Scotsman, June 6, 2007). 
 The benefits of using reference class forecasting are present both when delusion is 
substantial (and deception is relatively less important) and when deception is substantial 
(and delusion is relatively less relevant). The key is to choose a similar class of situations 
to the focal problem. In the first instance, cost and benefit estimates are affected by 
optimism. Reference class forecasting bypasses bottom up estimates for the project at 
hand and uses the actual outcomes (not biased estimates) of similar past projects. In the 
second instance, these estimates are not affected by optimism but have been purposely 
misrepresented to get the project approved. By using realized outcomes of similar past 
projects rather than manipulated estimates of the current project, reference class 
forecasting provides more reliable, top down estimates of the true costs and benefits of 
the project.  Reference class forecasting helps both to avoid common cognitive biases and 
strategic manipulation in order to produce more accurate forecasts. A new and related 
forecasting technique called Similarity Based Forecasting may provide even more 
accurate forecasts but has yet to be proved on infrastructure projects.66 
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The Way to Go  
Large infrastructure investments are a vital component of any public or private 
institution.  Unfortunately, cost overruns, delays and exaggerated benefits are the norm 
rather than the exception for roads, bridges, stadiums, concert halls, new plants, etc.  
Although large infrastructure projects occur frequently across the globe, any 
individual project is often a once in a career decision for a public or private executive. 
Thus it is difficult for executives to learn from their own prior mistakes. It is rare for 
executives to deliberately learn from similar projects other have attempted. Typically 
executives to adopt an inside view of any particular problem – where they focus on the 
specifics of the case at hand. Without the opportunity to learn from rapid and 
unambiguous feedback regarding their estimates of costs and benefits, executives can 
hardly learn from these unique decisions and avoid making similar mistakes in future 
projects. In such situations, inside view thinking leads to numerous cognitive biases that 
result in optimistic delusions.    
These, often individual, optimistic delusions are confounded, sometimes even 
dwarfed, by the magnitude of strategic deceptions among the different actors in the 
system.  On several occasions, however, decision makers have attempted to justify their 
deceptive behavior by arguing that the decision was in the public interest. On one hand, it 
can be argued that public-sector executives may decide to deliberately underestimate 
costs in order to provide public officials with an incentive to cut costs and thereby to save 
the public’s money. According to this type of explanation, higher cost estimates would be 
an incentive for wasteful contractors to spend more of the taxpayer’s money. Empirical 
studies have identified executives and planners who say they deliberately underestimate 
costs in this manner to save public money.67 Merewitz endorsed and summarized this 
viewpoint as “keeping costs low is more important than estimating costs correctly”.68  
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On the other hand, a second explanation in terms of public interest covers the not 
uncommon situation where project promoters believe their venture will benefit society 
and posterity. They feel that they should do anything possible to make the project happen, 
including cooking forecasts of costs and benefits. Both types of public-interest 
explanations see the end (project approval) as justifying the means (estimates of costs and 
benefits that show the project should be approved).69 
 However, these arguments overlook an important fact. Underestimating the costs 
and overestimating the benefits of a given project results in artificially high benefit-cost 
ratio, which in turn leads to two problems. First, the project may be started despite the 
fact that it is not economically viable. Second, a project may be started instead of another 
project that would have yielded higher returns had the actual costs and benefits of both 
projects been known. Thus, for reasons of economic efficiency alone, the argument that 
cost underestimation saves money must be rejected.70 As a case in point, an ex post 
benefit-cost analysis of the Channel tunnel between France and the UK showed that the 
actual net present value of the project to the British economy was minus US$17.8 billion 
and the actual internal rate of return minus 14.45 percent. The study concluded that “The 
British Economy would have been better off had the Tunnel never been constructed”.71  
Because delusion is often accompanied by strategic deception, this study’s 
prescriptive advice has been broken into two parts.  First, we focused on best practices to 
diminish strategic deceptions (e.g. P-A issues) in the specific context of infrastructure 
projects. Next, we examined how executives can adopt an “outside view” of problems by 
using reference class forecasting. This statistical procedure uses both a forecaster’s 
intuition and historical data to mitigate the two types of errors and arrive at a more 
accurate estimate.  The American Planning Association has recommended this procedure 
for large infrastructure projects. Its widespread use would surely produce more accurate 
estimates of large infrastructure projects and projects like Toll Collect and the Channel 
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tunnel would be profitably and happily foregone by the vast majority of the public. 
Ultimately, accurate reference class forecasting, proper incentives and budgets are the 
way to go. 
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Figure 1: Pioneer process plants cost forecasts accuracy (Merrow, Phillips 
and Meyers, 1981) 
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Figure 2: Multi-tier principal-agent relationships 
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Figure 3: Incentives and learning in large capital investments 
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Table 1: Avoiding strategic deception 
Actors Causes of deception Prescriptive advice 
1. Proposing and approving 
institutions (i.e. agents of the 
taxpayers) 
Proposing institution 
strategically misrepresents 
costs, timeframe, risks and 
benefits to obtain funding 
 
Proposing and approving 
institutions should share 
financial responsibility (e.g. 
minimum local contribution, 
local contribution for cost 
increases, identification of 
who “owns” the risks) 
 
Private financers should 
participate, without a 
sovereign guarantee, for a 
least one third of the total 
capital needs 
2. Planners, bidders and 
contractors (i.e. agents of the 
proposing institution) 
Planners strategically 
misrepresent costs, timeframe 
and benefits (to please the 
proposing institution) 
 
Financial and non-financial 
rewards for planners who 
proposed realistic estimates 
 
Strict forecasts audit 
 
Criminal penalties for 
purposely misleading forecasts 
 Bidders propose artificially 
low bids because of planned 
compensation through 
expected scope increases 
 
Contractors overprice scope 
increases 
Place financial responsibility 
with bidders 
 
 
 
Place financial responsibility 
with contractors for delays and 
scope increases 
 
 
 
